

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 100485

12  
ORIGIN EA-04

INFO OCT-01 SS-07 ADP-00 /012 R

66631  
DRAFTED BY EA/J: HLEVIN: MJA  
5/24/73 EXT. 23152  
APPROVED BY EA/J: MR. LEVIN  
----- 032178

R 242212 Z MAY 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0000

S E C R E T STATE 100485

LIMDIS

FOLLOWING SENT SECSTATE WASHDC INFO ANKARA ROME ATHENS BRUSSELS  
COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON LONDON LUXEMBOURG PARIS OTTAWA  
REYKJAVIK OSLO MOSCOW WARSAW PRAGUE BUDAPEST BELGRADE SOFIA  
HELSINKI VIENNA BERLIN NATO FROM BONN 22 MAY 73:

QUOTE BONN 07381

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, GW, UR  
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRG

SUMMARY: THE CHANCELLOR ASKED ME TO COME TO THE PALAIS  
SCHAUMBURG MAY 22, IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN FROM  
DEPARTURE CEREMONIES AT THE AIRPORT, FOR A BRIEFING ON  
THE BREZHNEV VISIT. HE COVERED PRINCIPALLY CSCE AND  
MBFR, THE BERLIN QUESTION, AND FRG-USSR ECONOMIC  
COOPERATION, BUT ALSO PROVIDED SOME INTERESTING  
INSIGHTS INTO BREZHNEV'S STYLE AND PERSONALITY AS THEY  
WERE REVEALED TO THE GERMANS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS.  
BRANDT APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD FORM DESPITE THE RIGORS  
OF THE VISIT AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 100485

SOME RATHER HARD AND UNPLEASANT BARGAINING, PARTICULARLY  
ON THE BERLIN PORTION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. END  
SUMMARY.

1. BRANDT OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE WANTED TO GIVE ME AN INITIAL BRIEFING EVEN THOUGH HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES HAD NOT YET HAD TIME TO RECORD ALL OF THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT AND SUBJECT THEM TO A CAREFUL EVALUATION.

2. CSCE. BREZHNEV PRESSED FOR RAPID MOVEMENT ON THE SECURITY CONFERENCE, ASKING WHY IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF PHASE I, FOR THE EXPERTS SIMPLY TO STAY ON AND BEGIN THEIR WORK RIGHT AWAY. THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO HOLD THE FINAL SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ( WHICH BREZHNEV WANTED HELD AT THE LEVEL OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT) BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. BREZHNEV DID NOT INSIST THAT THE FIRST PHASE BEGIN BEFORE THE END OF JUNE; ON THE CONTRARY, HE INDICATED THAT A SLIGHT DELAY MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT SINCE GROMYKO WOULD JUST HAVE RETURNED FROM THE VISIT TO THE U. S. AND WOULD NEED A LITTLE TIME TO ORGANIZE HIMSELF. IN VIEW OF THIS, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE 3RD OF JULY MIGHT BE A REASONABLE OPENING DATE.

3. BRANDT SAID HE TRIED TO CALM BREZHNEV'S EAGERNESS FOR RAPID MOVEMENT BY POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD MAKE SENSE TO BEGIN THE COMMITTEE PHASE ONLY AFTER SUMMER VACATION, SAY, IN SEPTEMBER. BREZHNEV SHOWED NO UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS, ARGUING THAT SUMMER VACATIONS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WHEN TRULY GREAT THINGS ARE AFOOT. BRANDT ALSO MADE CLEAR TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT THE FRG PREFERRED TO REMAIN FLEXIBLE AS TO THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD TAKE PLACE. ASCRIBING THESE VIEWS TO FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL, BRANDT TOLD BREZHNEV THAT THE LEVEL SHOULD PERHAPS DEPEND ON THE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST TWO PHASES: IF THE RESULTS WERE EXCELLENT, THEY SHOULD PERHAPS INDEED RECEIVE THE IMPRIMATUR OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT; BUT IF THEY WERE ONLY MEDIOCRE, ATTENDANCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE FINAL SESSION MIGHT HAVE TO DO.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 100485

4. AS FOR THE SITE OF THE FINAL CONFERENCE, BREZHNEV APPEARED TO HAVE NO STRONG PREFERENCES. HE MENTIONED PARIS BUT SAID HE WAS OPEN TO MANY ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING EVEN BONN OR MOSCOW. HOWEVER, HE WAS OPPOSED TO HELSINKI. BRANDT SAID THE FRG HAD A CERTAIN PREFERENCE FOR VIENNA FOR THE FINAL STAGE AND THOUGHT THAT GENEVA WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR THE COMMITTEE PHASE. HOWEVER, THESE WERE NOT STRONG PREFERENCES.

5. IN PRESSING FOR GREATER URGENCY ON CSCE, BREZHNEV TOLD BRANDT THAT THE U. S. HAD AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THIS CONFERENCE BEHIND US. BRANDT SAID HIS REPLY TO THIS WAS THAT THE FRG WOULD NOT PUT

ITSELF IN THE POSITION OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR A FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE CSCE PROCESS THIS YEAR.

6. MBFR. BRANDT SAID BREZHNEV HAD MADE CLEAR THAT, ALTHOUGH PREPARATIONS IN VIENNA COULD CONTINUE, GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR COULD ONLY BEGIN AFTER ALL PHASES OF CSCE HAD BEEN CONCLUDED. IN DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANCE OF MBFR, BRANDT SAID, BREZHNEV WAS EXTREMELY SPECIFIC ABOUT CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES AND RATHER VAGUE ABOUT REDUCTIONS AS SUCH. HE OBVIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FORMER AND WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL IN TALKING ABOUT THE VALUE OF HAVING OBSERVERS AT MANEUVERS AND EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON TROOP MOVEMENTS OF ANY SIGNIFICANT SIZE. ( IN THIS CONNECTION, BRANDT MENTIONED THAT DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER HAD BEEN POINTED OUT TO BREZHNEV ON THE FIRST EVENING OF THE VISIT AS THE MAN WHO HAD CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS INTRODUCING LARGE NUMBERS OF NEW MILITARY UNITS INTO THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA. BREZHNEV SAID THAT THIS ILLUSTRATED WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE TWO SIDES TO KEEP EACH OTHER MUTUALLY INFORMED.)

7. AS FOR REDUCTIONS PROPER, BRANDT SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD TAKEN A VERY CAUTIOUS APPROACH -- EVEN MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THE ONE THE GERMANS UNDERSTOOD HE HAD TAKEN IN HIS RECENT TALKS WITH MR. KISSINGER, AS REPORTED TO ALLIES BY USDEL NATO. HE SAID THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS HAD TO BE REGARDED AS SYMBOLIC IN CHARACTER, AND THAT FURTHER

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 100485

REDUCTIONS COULD ONLY BE MADE IN STAGES OVER A LONG PERIOD. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING BALANCE BETWEEN STATIONED TROOPS AND INDIGENOUS TROOPS. BREZHNEV POINTED OUT THAT ONE AREA, THAT OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS, HAD TO BE DISCUSSED BILATERALLY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U. S.; HE ALSO MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT MEAN TO INCLUDE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THIS HEADING. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTIONS FROM ME, BRANDT SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD NOT TOUCHED AT ALL ON THE SUBJECT OF FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS ( FBS).

8. BERLIN. BRANDT SAID THE EFFORTS OF THE FRG SIDE TO OBTAIN SOME SATISFACTION WITH REGARD TO THEIR CONCERNs OVER BERLIN HAD CAUSED MORE DIFFICULTY THAN ANY OTHER SUBJECT DURING THE VISIT. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT RESPONDED WILLINGLY AND ON OCCASION HAD REBUFFED EFFORTS BY BAHR AND SCHEEL TO RAISE BERLIN WITH THEM. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT THEY SIMPLY ADOPT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION THE SAME LANGUAGE USED IN THE SOVIET- GDR COMMUNIQUE OF MAY 13. 1973. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FRG WHICH, FOR ITS PART, WANTED TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE CONCERNING THE " TIES" BETWEEN THE FRG

AND BERLIN. THEIR COMPROMISE WAS TO DO NEITHER BUT TO EXPRESS THEIR AGREEMENT THAT " STRICT ADHERENCE TO AND IMPLEMENTATION OF" THE BERLIN AGREEMENT WAS A " SIGNIFICANT CONDITION" FOR EUROPEAN DETENTE. ( SEE PARAGRAPH 17 OF BONN 7321 FOR FULL TEXT OF JOINT DECLARATION LANGUAGE ON BERLIN.) BRANDT, OBVIOUSLY BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW THE SOVIETS ARE GOING TO BEHAVE IN BERLIN, SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT TO USE THE WORD " CONDITION" ( VORAUSSETZUNG).

9. I ASKED BRANDT WHETHER BREZHNEV HAD GIVEN HIM ANY ASSURANCES AT ALL ABOUT THE FUTURE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS BERLIN. BRANDT SAID HE HAD NOT AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT EFFECT IF ANY WOULD BE PRODUCED ON THE SOVIETS BY THE EMPHASIS GIVEN TO BERLIN MATTERS BY THE GERMAN SIDE. BRANDT SAID HE TOLD BREZHNEV, IN GROMYKO'S PRESENCE, THAT FRG- USSR RELATIONS WOULD BE " POISONED" IF THINGS WENT

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 100485

" DIFFERENTLY THAN AS DISCUSSED" DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT ( I. E. IF THE USSR CONTINUED TO INTERFERE IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE FRG TO EXPAND ITS TIES AND TO REPRESENT BERLIN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT). THE CHANCELLOR SAID THE FACT THAT THREE AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED BECAUSE THEY HAD SATISFACTORY BERLIN CLAUSES BUT THAT THE COMPLETION OF TWO OTHERS HAD BEEN FORESTALLED BY FAILURE TO AGREE ON THE INCLUSION OF BERLIN PROVIDED CONTINUING EVIDENCE TO THE SOVIETS OF THE IMPORTANCE THE FRG ATTACHES TO THIS MATTER.

10. ECONOMIC COOPERATION. BRANDT SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD BEEN EXPANSIVE IN HIS DISCUSSION OF THIS FIELD AND THAT IN THE PROCESS HE HAD BUILT WHAT BRANDT DESCRIBED AS " A LOT OF CASTLES IN THE AIR". HE HAD OBVIOUSLY TRIED TO PLAY THE FRG OFF AGAINST THE U. S. BY POINTING TO THE MANY DEALS THAT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED WITH U. S. FIRMS AND TO THE FACT THAT U. S. INTEREST RATES ARE LOWER. HE ALSO REFERRED TO PLANS FOR COOPERATION WITH JAPAN ON SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, IMPLYING THAT THE JAPANESE WERE BEING MORE COOPERATIVE AND VENTURE-SOME THAT THE FRG SEEMED INCLINED TO BE. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT SOME OF THE VAST SCHEMES HE HAD IN MIND MIGHT EXCEED THE CAPACITY OF GERMAN FIRMS, HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT GERMAN- AMERICAN- SOVIET TRIANGULAR PROJECTS. HE ALSO AT ONE POINT REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TRIANGULAR JAPANESE- AMERICAN- SOVIET PROJECTS.

11. BRANDT FOUND IT INTERESTING THAT BREZHNEV HAD

STRESSED TWICE TO HIM THAT HE " RECOGNIZED" THE EEC.  
BRANDT THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FACT  
THAT EARLIER SOVIET STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT HAD  
REFERRED TO THE " COMMON MARKET". ( THE CHANCELLOR  
SEEMS TO THINK THAT THIS SHIFT OF USAGE INDICATED A  
NEW RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-  
TIES AS MORE THAN AN ECONOMIC UNION, BUT FROM THE WAY  
HE DESCRIBED IT TO ME IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY  
SIGNIFICANT.)

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 100485

12. BRANDT NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT PRESSED FOR  
A FORMAL AGREEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS, LIKE THE ONES  
CONCLUDED WITH FRANCE AND THE U. S., BUT HAD BEEN SATIS-  
FIED TO PUT LANGUAGE ON CONSULTATIONS INTO THE JOINT  
DECLARATION ( SEE PARAGRAPH 4 OF BONN 7321). IN THIS  
CONNECTION, I ASKED BRANDT ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS  
REGULARLY SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN IN NOVEMBER BUT THAT,  
OWING TO THE STATED DESIRE TO INTENSIFY ECONOMIC RELA-  
TIONS, THIS DATE MIGHT BE ADVANCED SOMEWHAT.

13. BRANDT HAD SEVERAL INTERESTING THINGS TO SAY ABOUT  
BREZHNEV'S PERSONALITY AND STYLE. FOR ONE THING, HE  
SAID THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS DEVELOPING AN INCREASINGLY  
STRONG TENDENCY TO TURN DIALOGUES INTO MONOLOGUES,  
HARDLY PERMITTING HIS INTERLOCUTORS TO GET A WORD IN  
EDGEWISE. ( BRANDT NOTED THAT HENRY KISSINGER MUST HAVE  
HAD SOME EXPERIENCE WITH THIS PROBLEM DURING RECENT  
VISIT TO MOSCOW.) IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE PATIENT, TO  
KEEP POINTING OUT THAT YOU HAD THINGS TO SAY, AND  
EVENTUALLY TO PRESENT THEM AS BEST YOU COULD. A FURTHER  
COMPLICATING FACTOR WAS THAT BREZHNEV REFUSED TO DISCUSS  
BUSINESS AT TABLE, INSISTING ON USING THIS TIME FOR  
JOKES, STORYTELLING, ETC.

14. BREZHNEV ASKED THE CHANCELLOR A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL  
QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO WASHINGTON:  
WHETHER IT WAS INDEED NECESSARY TO SPEND A CERTAIN  
AMOUNT OF TIME SLEEPING OFF THE EFFECTS OF THE FLIGHT  
( BRANDT CONFIRMED THAT FOR HIM IT WAS); AND WHETHER  
COWBOY FILMS WERE SHOWN AT CAMP DAVID ( BRANDT SAID HE  
HAD RECENTLY SEEN SOME GOOD ONES THERE).

15. SOME MARGINAL COMMENTS ON THE VISIT FROM BRANDT'S  
ASSISTANTS, SCHILLING AND SANNE MAY BE OF INTEREST:

( A) THE GREAT ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFICULTY OF THE  
VISIT AROSE BECAUSE THE SOVIET SIDE, FOR SECURITY'S  
SAKE, INSISTED ON COMPLETE FLEXIBILITY. NO FIRM  
SCHEDULE COULD EVEN BE ESTABLISHED AMONG PLANNERS, LET

ALONE MADE PUBLIC. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GENERAL  
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 100485

SECRETARY EXPECTED EVERYTHING TO WORK.

( B ) VERY FEW ON THE SOVIET SIDE ARE BOLD ENOUGH  
TO APPROACH BREZHNEV TO TELL HIM ANYTHING THAT HE MIGHT  
POSSIBLY FIND UNPLEASANT. THE ONLY ONES WHO WERE WILL-  
ING TO DO THIS, SO FAR AS THE GERMANS COULD DISCERN,  
WERE BREZHNEV' S PERSONAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS,  
ALEXANDROV AND BLATOV, AND THE SECURITY CHIEF, ANTONOV.

( C ) THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN  
ALEXANDROV AND BLATOV WAS NOT FULLY CLEAR TO THE  
GERMANS, BUT IT APPEARED TO THEM THAT THE FORMER HAD A  
MORE DIRECT CONCERN WITH POLICY TOWARD THE U. S. WHEREAS  
BLATOV' S AREA OF CONCENTRATION WAS EUROPE.  
HILLENBRAND UNQUOTE RUSH

SECRET

NMAFVVZCZ

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptoning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 10 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 MAY 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973STATE100485  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** EA/J: HLEVIN: MJA  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730560/abqcemox.tel  
**Line Count:** 292  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ORIGIN EA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 17 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <17-Aug-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <16-Nov-2001 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 980305  
**Subject:** BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRG  
**TAGS:** PFOR, GW, UR  
**To:** n/a INFO TOKYO  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005